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INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
INTRODUCTION
The Tenth Circuit issued two published intellectual property opinions
during the September 1994 to September 1995 survey period. These cases
warrant discussion for their advancement of new law and adoption of legal
principles common in other circuits. In Vornado Air Circulation Systems v.
Duracraft Corp.,' the Tenth Circuit demonstrated the dormant power of feder-
al patent law.2 In Vornado, the court permitted patent law "principles" to
trump the clear statutory language of the Lanham Act.' According to the
court, the Lanham Act may not protect a nonfunctional product configuration
constituting part of a utility patent claim, even if the configuration falls within
the Act's explicit protections.' The Tenth Circuit also decided Stanfield v.
Osborne Industries.' In a holding consistent with other circuits, the Stanfield
court held that granting a license to use a trademark without maintaining ade-
quate quality control measures results in the licensor's abandonment of rights
to the trademark.6
This Survey analyzes both Vornado and Stanfield. Part I discusses the
history and relationship between the federal patent system and the Lanham
Act's protection for trademarks and trade dress. After presenting the facts and
decision in Vornado, Part I compares the Tenth Circuit's decision to those of
other circuits and then analyzes the court's reasoning. In addressing the
Stanfield decision, Part II first discusses the history of trademark licensing and
the requirements of quality control. Part II then presents the facts and decision
in Stanfield, analyzes the court's position, and briefly addresses the positions
of other circuits on similar issues.
I. PATENT LAW'S CORE PURPOSE PREEMPTS THE LANHAM ACT
A. Statutory Background
Three basic principles support the federal patent system: (1) "to foster and
reward inventionf" by permitting an inventor to enforce contracts licensing
inventions in exchange for royalties;' (2) to "promote[] disclosure of
1. 58 F.3d 1498 (10th Cir. 1995).
2. Vornado, 58 F.3d at 1508-10 (discussing the relevance of federal patent law principles
and policy).
3. Id.; see Lanham Act, Pub. L. No. 79-489, 60 Stat. 427 (1946) (codified as amended at
15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1994)).
4. Vornado, 58 F.3d at 1510.
5. 52 F.3d 867 (10th Cir. 1995).
6. Stanfield, 52 F.3d at 871 (adopting the views of the Second and Ninth circuits).
7. Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 262 (1979). To qualify for a patent,
an invention must satisfy the three elements of utility, novelty, and non-obviousness. 35 U.S.C. §§
101-103 (1994). The inventor must first show that the invention is "useful." Id. § 101. "Useful"
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inventions ... once the patent expires" and thus allow public use of the pat-
ented invention;8 and (3) "to assure that ideas in the public domain remain
there for the free use of the public."
Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act provides protection for trademarks.'0
Courts have interpreted section 43(a) to protect "trade dress," the features
comprising a product's look or image." When litigating trade dress infringe-
ment issues, plaintiffs must establish that the trade dress is either (1) inherent-
ly distinctive, or (2) has acquired secondary meaning and that confusion in the
marketplace would result from copying. 2 If determined primarily function-
al,' 3 however, competitors may copy the trade dress. 4 Both courts and com-
mentators acknowledge that the functionality defense prevents the Lanham Act
from conflicting with federal patent law. 5
generally means that the item serves some identifiable benefit to people. See, e.g., Brenner v.
Manson, 383 U.S. 519-30 (1966) (explaining the requirement and definition of utility). An inven-
tion is "novel" if another person has not already produced the exact same invention. 35 U.S.C. §
102. Finally, the inventor must establish that the invention is "'non-obvious' to a person having
ordinary skill in the art which the subject matter pertains." Id. § 103.
8. Aronson, 440 U.S. at 262.
9. Id.
10. Section 43(a) provides in part:
(1) Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or any container
for goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any combina-
tion thereof, or any false designation of origin ... which-
(A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the affili-
ation, connection, or association of such person with another person, or as to the ori-
gin ... of his or her goods ... shall be liable in a civil action by any person who be-
lieves that he or she is or is likely to be damaged by such act.
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1994).
11. The Tenth Circuit explains trade dress as follows:
Trade dress is a complex composite of features. One may be size, another may be color
or color combinations, another may be texture, another may be the graphics and arrange-
ment and so on. Trade dress is a term reflecting the overall general impact, usually
visual, but sometimes also tactile, of all these features taken together.
Hartford House, Ltd. v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 846 F.2d 1268, 1271 (10th Cir.) (citing SK & F Co.
v. Premo Pharmaceutical Lab., 481 F. Supp. 1184, 1187 (D.N.J. 1979), aff d, 625 F.2d 1055 (3d
Cir. 1980)), cert. denied, 448 U.S. 708 (1988).
12. Vornado, 58 F.3d at 1502-03.
13. In W.T. Rogers Co. v. Keene, 778 F.2d 334 (7th Cir. 1985), the Seventh Circuit dis-
cussed extensively the concept of functionality. The court provided an example: "A firm that
makes footballs could not use as its trademark the characteristic oval shape of the football, thereby
forcing its rivals to find another shape for their footballs." Id. at 339. Because a football must be
oval to function correctly, the shape is functional. Id. No alternative shapes exist that would suf-
fice for a football. Id.
One test used to determine functionality is to ask "whether the protection of the feature
would hinder competition or impinge upon the rights of others to compete effectively in the sale
of goods." Hallmark Cards, 846 F.2d at 1272. If competitors could use alternative designs, the
challenged feature would likely be found nonfunctional. Id. at 1273.
As one commentator explained, "[A] nonfunctional feature ... is one with perfect (or
nearly perfect) substitutes." Malla Pollack, Unconstitutional Incontestability? The Intersection of
the Intellectual Property and Commerce Clauses of the Constitution: Beyond a Critique of Shake-
speare v. Silstar Co., 18 SEATrLE U. L. REV. 259, 265 (1995).
14. Vornado, 58 F.3d at 1503.
15. See infra note 32.
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B. Case Law Background
1. The Sears-Compco Decisions
The idea that the federal patent system prevents other laws from protect-
ing an invention originates from Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co.' 6 and
Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc.7 Because these decisions were
consistent and announced on the same day, they have become known as the
Sears-Compco decisions. The Sears-Compco decisions prohibit states from
enacting laws protecting objects if such protection is inconsistent with the
objectives of federal patent laws. 8
The dispute in Sears began when Sears copied a pole lamp design for
which Stiffel had obtained both design and utility patents." Stiffel sued Sears
for patent infringement and unfair competition, claiming that Sears had caused
confusion in the market about the source of Sears's lamps.2" The Supreme
Court found the lamp unpatentable and held that federal patent law preempted
Illinois unfair competition laws.2' The Court explained that "[a]n unpatentable
article, like an article on which the patent has expired, is in the public domain
and may be made and sold by whoever chooses to do so."22 This reasoning
led to a similar result in Compco.23
2. Cases Following the Sears-Compco Decisions
Over two decades later, the Supreme Court returned to this issue in Bonito
Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc.24 Bonito sued Thunder Craft under a
Florida statute prohibiting "direct molding," a simple and inexpensive way of
duplicating boat hulls. 25 The Supreme Court held that the Florida law "sub-
stantially impede[d] the public use of the otherwise unprotected design and
16. 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
17. 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
18. Sears, 376 U.S. at 231. The Supreme Court subsequently explained the Sears-Compco
decisions as follows:
[Ildeas once placed before the public without the protection of a valid patent are subject
to appropriation without significant restraint.
At the heart of Sears and Compco [sic] is the conclusion that the efficient opera-
tion of the federal patent system depends upon substantially free trade in publicly
known, unpatented design and utilitarian conceptions.
Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 156 (1989) (citations omitted).
19. Sears, 376 U.S. at 225-26.
20. Id. at 226.
21. Id. at 231-33. The Court stated, "When [a] patent expires, the monopoly created by it
expires, too, and the right to make the article-including the right to make it in precisely the
shape it carried when patented-passes to the public." Id. at 230.
22. Id. at 231.
23. Compco, 376 U.S. at 238. Compco also involved a lamp design protected by a state
unfair competition law that conflicted with federal patent laws. Id. at 234. Day-Brite sued Compco
for unfair competition for copying the design of its lighting fixtures. Id. at 235. The district court
held the design of the lighting fixtures manufactured by Day-Brite unpatentable. Id. As in Sears,
the Supreme Court held that federal patent law preempted state unfair competition laws protecting
the lighting fixture. Id. at 238.
24. 489 U.S. 141 (1989).
25. Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 144-45. Bonito Boats did not have a patent for the boat hull
design in question. id. at 144.
19961
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
utilitarian ideas embodied in unpatented boat hulls," and therefore federal pat-
ent law preempted the Florida statute.26
The Third Circuit, however, in Sylvania Electric Products v. Dura Elec-
tric Lamp Co., recognized a situation where trademark protections survive
against federal patent law.27 Sylvania sued Dura for copying Sylvania's regis-
tered "blue dot" flash bulb system." Applying the general rule that trademark
protection does not extend to functional articles,29 the Sylvania court held that
it may extend to a feature of a patentable article as long as the portion protect-
ed by the trademark adds no functional use or value.3" Sylvania's claim ulti-
mately failed because the blue dot flash bulb system itself was functional."
Other courts and commentators have recognized the necessity of this
functionality exception to trademark protection.32 As the next section dis-
cusses, however, the Tenth Circuit departed from this trend and distanced
itself from the functionality requirement.
C. Vornado Air Circulation Systems v. Duracraft Corp.:33
The Tenth Circuit's Rejection of the Functionality Defense
In Vornado, the Tenth Circuit confronted competing policies. Vornado
alleged a classic claim of trade dress infringement, but the claim also involved
an object in the public domain.3" On February 22, 1994, the Patent Office
issued a utility patent to Vornado's founders for a ducted fan manufactured
26. Id. at 157, 168. The Court also referred to the "balance struck by Congress in our patent
laws" between protection and public domain, and noted that "state regulation of intellectual prop-
erty must yield" to that balance. Id. at 152. As a matter of law, once a patent has expired, the
public is free to use the subject matter of the expired patent. Id.
In dicta, the Court recognized that "the common-law tort of unfair competition has been
limited to protection against copying of nonfunctional aspects of consumer products which have
acquired secondary meaning such that they operate as a designation of source." Id. at 158. It is
this nonfunctional requirement that supposedly prevents friction between the Lanham Act and
federal patent law. See W.T. Rogers Co. v. Keene, 778 F.2d 334, 337-38 (7th Cir. 1985) (recog-
nizing a nonfunctionality defense).
27. 247 F.2d 730 (3d Cir. 1957).
28. Sylvania, 247 F.2d at 731. The blue dot indicated when the bulb was spent. Id.
29. Id. at 732; see RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 715 (1938) (stating that "[a] trade-mark is any
mark, word, letter, number, design, picture, or combination thereof in any form or arrangement,
which . . . (c) is not ... a designation descriptive of goods or of their quality, ingredients, proper-
ties or functions").
30. Sylvania, 247 F.2d at 734 n.I.
31. Id. at 734. The court stated that "[t]he purpose of this rule is obviously to prevent the
grant of perpetual monopoly by the issuance of a trade-mark in the situation where a patent has
either expired, or for one reason or another, cannot be granted." Id. at 732.
32. For example, in W.T. Rogers Co., the Seventh Circuit stated that when dealing with a
claim for trademark/trade dress infringement, "provided that a defense of functionality is recog-
nized, there is no conflict with federal patent law." W.T. Rogers Co., 778 F.2d at 337. The court
recognized that the functionality defense only exists to "head off a collision between section 43(a)
and patent law." Id. at 338. Commentators have embraced the idea that the functionality defense
keeps the Lanham Act and patent laws in separate comers. One commentator stated that the pur-
pose behind the doctrine of functionality is "to exclude from trademark protection subject matter
properly covered by utility patents." Jay Dratler Jr., Trademark Protection for Industrial Designs,
1988 U. ILL. L. REv. 887, 928.
33. 58 F.3d 1498 (10th Cir. 1995).
34. Vornado, 58 F.3d at 1500.
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with a spiral grill. 5 Although patent protection did not extend to the grill it-
self because it was already in the public domain,36 Vornado was able to pat-
ent the entire configuration because of the fan,37 and in the original patent
request asserted that the spiral grill increased air flow and enhanced the fan's
safety.3" Vornado's own tests, however, had revealed that fans adorned with
commonly shaped grills worked as well as Vornado fans.39 Thus, according
to Vornado, the spiral design served no useful function other than pure aes-
thetic enhancement.'" From November 1988 until August 1990, Vornado was
the only company selling fans with a spiral grill.4' Thus, according to the dis-
trict court, consumers associated the grill design solely with Vornado fans.42
In August 1990, Duracraft began selling the DT-7 "Turbo Fan."43 The
DT-7 "Turbo Fan" was an inexpensive house fan with a spiral grill designed
specifically to avoid infringing upon Vornado's patent while replicating the
appearance of Vornado's spiral grill." Vornado sued Duracraft, alleging that
Duracraft infringed upon Vornado's trade dress.45 The district court found
that the spiral grill design was nonfunctional and inherently distinctive and that
"consumers were likely to be confused by Duracraft's use of a similar
grill.
46
35. Id. Vomado's founders acquired their first patent on May 22, 1990, and subsequently
applied for a reissue patent which was granted on February 20, 1994. Id.
36. Id. The spiral grill was in the public domain because it was part of earlier expired patent.
Id. The grill was known as the AirTensity Grill. James W. Dabney, Trademarks, Unfair Competi-
tion, and Copyrights: Recent Developments and Other Selected Issues, C962 ALI-ABA 179, 201
(1994).
37. Vornado, 58 F.3d at 1500.
38. Dabney, supra note 36, at 200, 202. Specifically, the 1990 patent claimed that the grill
design was superior to a conventional grill in that it absorbed impact shock better, provided higher
air flow at a normal power usage, and focused output where the vents were spaced at their maxi-
mum. Id. Vornado also advertised that the AirTensity Grill served a functional purpose. Examples
of advertisements included claims that the AirTensity grill: "actually amplifies the vortex for bet-
ter, more efficient operation," id.; "is specifically designed to amplify and enhance the naturally
occurring vortex created by the propeller"; and "fit] accomplishes a high degree of safety and
functionality." Id. at 202-04.
39. Vornado, 58 F.3d at 1500. In fact, according to Vornado's expert, alternative grill de-
signs produced better results. Dabney, supra note 36, at 259. An in-court comparison of Vornado
fans with different grills illustrated little or no difference in the velocity or effect of the air flow
when using a spiral grill rather than a straight radial grill. Id. at 261. The district court found that
any difference in performance between fans using spiral grills and fans using normal radial grills
was minimal at best and that there was no "practical difference in the performance between such
grills." Id. at 264.
40. Vornado, 58 F.3d at 1501. Vornado argued that the spiral shape was chosen mainly to
associate the fan with the name "Vornado," a combination of "vortex" and "tornado." Dabney,
supra note 36, at 248.
41. Vornado, 58 F.3d at 1500. Vornado began selling its fans in November 1988. Id. Ap-
parently, no other competitors offered fans with spiral grills. Id.
42. See id. at 1502 n.7 (noting that the district court found "an association between the grill
design and [the] Vornado [namel").
43. Id. at 1500.
44. Id. at 1500-01. The President/CEO of Duracraft had decided "'to borrow some ideas
from' the Vornado," and the result was the DT-7 "Turbo Fan." Dabney, supra note 36, at 254.
45. Vornado, 58 F.3d at 1501.
46. Id. at 1501-02. Vornado introduced evidence of a consumer who had bought both a
Vornado fan and a Duracraft DT-7 "Turbo Fan" and believed that the same company manufac-
tured both fans due to similarities in fan design. Dabney, supra note 36, at 264-65. Other witness-
es associated with retailers who sell Vornado fans testified that they had confused DT-7 "Turbo
1996]
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The Tenth Circuit admitted that it was reasonable "to assume that a
nonfunctionality requirement would eliminate any possible conflicts between
the Lanham Act and the Patent Act."'47 Relying on Bonito Boats, however,
the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court, stating that the Supreme Court
had previously determined that once a product feature enters the public do-
main, competitors may copy and use the product feature." Therefore, the
Supreme Court's precedent mandated that when unfair competition laws pro-
tecting a product shape from copying clashes with the right to copy under
federal patent law, "the right to copy must prevail."'49
Because of the conflict between the Lanham's Act trade dress protection
and the right to copy under federal patent law, both statutes cannot simulta-
neously apply. Therefore, the Tenth Circuit looked to the "fundamental pur-
poses" of each statute to determine which statute prevailed." The court stated
that federal patent law's objective was to pass on technological progress to the
public." The Tenth Circuit also concluded that protecting against consumer
confusion associated with copying a product configuration is not a primary
emphasis of section 43(a) of the Lanham Act.52 Therefore, in resolving the
conflict between federal patent laws and federal trademark protections, the
Tenth Circuit favored "core patent principles."53 The court held that
where a disputed product configuration is part of a claim in a utility
patent, and the configuration is a described, significant inventive
aspect of the invention... so that without it the invention could not
fairly be said to be the same invention, patent law prevents its protec-
tion as trade dress, even if the configuration is nonfunctional. 4
D. Other Circuits
The Court of Patent Appeals faced a factually similar situation in In re
Shakespeare Co.," also finding in favor of the federal right to copy expired
patents. 6 The appellant in Shakespeare manufactured fishing rods using a
patented process.57 A natural result of the unique manufacturing process was
a spiral design embedded in the rod.5" After the public began associating the
spiral mark with Shakespeare's rods, the company attempted to register the
Fans" with Vornado fans. Id. at 265. Also, a store employee who sells Vomado fans testified that
upon seeing the DT-7 "Turbo Fan," he knew that the fan was "a 'copycat' or [a] 'knockoff' of a
Vornado [fan]." Id.
47. Vornado, 58 F.3d at 1506.
48. Id. at 1503.
49. Id. at 1504.
50. Id. at 1507.
51. Id. at 1508.
52. Id. at 1509.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 1510.
55. 289 F.2d 506 (C.C.P.A. 1961).
56. Shakespeare, 289 F.2d at 508.




spiral mark.59 The court denied Shakespeare's request because the patented
process would eventually pass into the public domain.' The court believed
that the spiral design was nonfunctional.' Despite this belief, the court de-
nied Shakespeare trade dress protection because such protection violated the
right to copy under federal patent law.62
In contrast, the Ninth Circuit applied the Third Circuit's functionality
distinction when addressing a similar situation in Clamp Manufacturing v.
Enco Manufacturing.63 Clamp Manufacturing (Clamp) manufactured and dis-
tributed the Kant-twist c-clamp under an expired patent.64 When Enco began
selling an identical c-clamp, litigation ensued and the district court held that
Enco infringed upon Clamp's configuration.6' After examining the meaning
of functionality in detail,' the Ninth Circuit upheld the district court's ruling.
The Ninth Circuit held that although the Kant-twist clamp was the subject
matter of an expired utility patent, the Kant-twist clamp's configuration was
nonfunctional.67
E. Analysis
The Tenth Circuit in Vornado ignored the fact that the spiral design failed
to improve the performance of Vomado's fans. Vomado argued, and the dis-
trict court found, that the spiral design is neither functional nor necessary for
competition since the Vomado fan worked equally well with other grill de-
signs." The only reason to copy the spiral grill design, therefore, was aesthet-
ic enhancement. Despite Vornado's argument, the Tenth Circuit concluded that
preventing others from copying features of a product with an expired patent
59. Id.
60. Id. at 508. If competitors could not make rods with the unique spiral markings, com-
petitors would be unable to practice the patented process upon the patent's expiration. Thus, al-
lowing trademark protection would grant the appellants a perpetual monopoly on the process or
require competitors to incur the expense of grinding off the spiral mark from their rods. Either
way, allowing protection hinders competition. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. 870 F.2d 512 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 901 (1989).
64. Clamp, 870 F.2d at 513 & n.1.
65. Id. at 514. The district court found "that the Kant-twist clamps were distinctive, primari-
ly nonfunctional, arbitrary, and that commercially feasible alternative configurations existed." Id.
at 516.
66. See id. at 515-17. The Clamp court quoted from an earlier Ninth Circuit decision:
"Functional features of a product are features 'which constitute the actual benefit that the consum-
er wishes to purchase, as distinguished from an assurance that a particular entity made, sponsored,
or endorsed a product."' Id. at 516 (quoting Vuitton Et Fils S.A. v. J. Young Enters., 644 F.2d
769, 772 (9th Cir. 1981)). The court looked at several factors in analyzing functionality, including:
[T]he existence of an expired utility patent disclosing the utilitarian advantage of the
design sought to be protected as a trademark; the extent of advertising touting the utili-
tarian advantages of the design; the availability of alternative designs; and whether a
particular design results from a comparatively simple or cheap method of manufacture.
Id.
67. Id. at 516-17. Necessary to the court's decision was the fact that the "C" design of the
clamp added nothing to the utility of the clamp and that other designs were available. Id. at 516.
68. Vornado, 58 F.3d at 1501.
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seriously conflicts with the patent system's core objectives, "even when those
features are not necessary to [sic] competition."'
Both Vornado and Shakespeare enable competitors to legally produce
similar, but inferior, products. Under these decisions, competitors can legally
manufacture an inferior fishing rod affixed with a spiral design or produce a
poor-quality fan adorned with a spiral grill.7" In Shakespeare, however, prac-
ticing the patent necessarily resulted in the appearance of a spiral marking on
the rod.7' Competitors practicing the Vornado patent, on the other hand,
could easily achieve the Vornado's functionality without including the spiral
grill because the grill failed to enhance the fan's functionality. A competitor's
ability to practice the useful aspects of an expired patent is certainly important.
If, however, the overall appearance of a patented invention has become associ-
ated with a particular company, and practicing the patent does not dictate a
particular appearance for the resulting product, the invention's appearance
should be entitled to trade dress protection.
The Tenth Circuit considered important the fact that the spiral grill consti-
tuted part of an expired patent.72 The court, however, should not have ignored
Vomado's tests demonstrating that the spiral design failed to improve the fan's
performance. If accurate, the tests show that the spiral design is not necessary
to foster competition. Competitors simply employ the spiral design to enhance
sales by confusing potential Vornado fan consumers. Benefits certainly result
from allowing subsequent inventors to build upon the genius and practical
experience of expired patent holders. These benefits, however, should not pre-
empt Lanham Act protection for the general appearance of a patented inven-
tion if the appearance is not a necessary aspect of the patent's utility.73
69. Id. at 1508.
70. Vornado fans actually function differently from ordinary house fans. Vornado fans shoot
a beam of air into a wall at such a high speed that streams of air begin circulating around the
room. Susan Caba, From Futuristic to Vintage, Fans Today are so Cool, They're Hot, ARiZ. RE-
PUBLIC, Aug. 6, 1994, at AH6. By putting a spiral grill on their fans similar to Vornado's,
Duracraft can mislead the public into believing that their fan operates the same as a Vornado fan.
On the other hand, Duracraft attorneys have called the decision "a great victory for con-
sumers" since Vornado will not be able to hold a perpetual monopoly on patented subject matter.
Roz Hutchinson, Vornado Loses Appeals Ruling on Trademark, WICHITA Bus. J., July 21, 1995, §
1, at 1.
71. Shakespeare, 289 F.2d at 507.
72. Vornado, 58 F.3d at 1500.
73. Although the Tenth Circuit's decision seems contrary to what the functionality doctrine
directs, some support exists for the Vornado decision in past Supreme Court cases. In Bonito
Boats, the Supreme Court conceded that "all state regulation of potentially patentable but unpat-
ented subject matter is not ipso facto preempted by the federal patent laws." Bonito Boats, Inc. v.
Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141 (1989). By analogy, the same would be true for Lanham
Act protection since the Lanham Act is simply the federal government's version of an unfair com-
petition law. Id.
However, the Supreme Court also stated that "the heart of Sears and Compco [sic] is the
conclusion that the efficient operation of the federal patent system depends upon substantially free
trade in publicly known, unpatented design and utilitarian conceptions." Id. at 156. Further, the
Supreme Court has recognized that "the ultimate goal of public disclosure and use [of once-pat-
ented inventions] is the centerpiece of federal patent policy." Id. at 157.
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II. LICENSING RIGHTS TO A TRADE NAME
A. Background
Trademark law permits trademark owners to issue licenses for the use of
registered trademarks.74 The trademark owner, however, must ensure that the
licensee maintains the quality of goods bearing the trademark." Failure to
ensure quality control results in a "naked" license.76 A naked license may
justify a court's finding that the trademark owner has abandoned the trade-
mark." Once abandonment occurs, the trademark owner may not assert rights
to the trademark."8
The belief that naked licensing is "inherently deceptive" underlies the
quality control requirement.79 The quality control requirement protects the
public from being misled."0 The Second Circuit decided one of the principal
naked licensing cases in 1959."
In Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart's Food Stores,"7 the plaintiff brought an ac-
tion to enjoin the defendant, Hart's Food, from using the name "Dawn" in
connection with its donut sales. 3 As part of its defense, Hart's Foods claimed
Dawn had failed to exercise adequate control over the quality of donuts sold
by Dawn's licensees and thus had abandoned the mark.84 The Second Circuit
noted that failing to include quality control requirements in licensing agree-
ments results in the production and sale of goods with varying qualities
74. Moore Business Forms v. Ryu, 960 F.2d 486, 489 (5th Cir. 1992).
75. Id. The Lanham Act allows companies related to the owner of a trademark to use the
owner's mark so long as the use of the mark does not deceive the public. 15 U.S.C. § 1055
(1994). The Lanham Act defines "related company" as "any person whose use of a mark is con-
trolled by the owner of the mark with respect to the nature and quality of the goods or services on
or in connection with which the mark is used." Id. § 1127. To ensure that the use does not de-
ceive the public, the owner of the trademark must control the nature and quality of goods bearing
the mark. Id. § 1055.
76. Moore, 960 F.2d at 489.
77. Id.
78. Id. Abandonment precludes the licensor from bringing any complaints concerning in-
fringement of the mark. AmCan Enters. v. Renzi, 32 F.3d 233, 235 (7th Cir. 1994).
79. First Interstate Bancorp v. Stenquist, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d 1704, 1706 (N.D. Cal. 1990). Quali-
ty control ensures that the "trademark is not used to deceive the public as to the quality of the
goods or services bearing the name." Oberlin v. Marlin Am. Corp., 596 F.2d 1322, 1327 (7th Cir.
1979).
80. Haymaker Sports, Inc. v. Turian, 581 F.2d 257, 261 (C.C.P.A. 1978). Commentator
Frank I. Schechter remarked that "the trade-mark is not merely the symbol of good-will but often
the most effective agent for the creation of good-will, imprinting upon the public mind an anony-
mous and impersonal guaranty of satisfaction, creating a desire for further satisfactions." Kevin
Parks, "Naked" Is Not a Four-letter Word: Debunking the Myth of the "Quality Control Require-
ment" in Trademark Licensing, 82 TRADEMARK REP. 531, 532 (1992). Furthermore, the trademark
has become an assurance of quality. Id. Failing to maintain the quality of products bearing a li-
censed trademark defrauds the public since the public is relying on the trademark name as guaran-
tee of quality. Id. at 533.
81. See Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart's Food Stores, 267 F.2d 358 (2d Cir. 1959) (discussing
whether the Lanham Act protects the "Dawn" trademark).
82. 267 F.2d 358 (2d Cir. 1959).
83. Dawn, 267 F.2d at 360. Hart's Food Stores sold baked goods in their grocery stores with
the word "Dawn" imprinted on the packages. Id. at 361. Dawn sold doughnut mix to bakeries and
allowed those bakers to sell the doughnuts under its name. Id.
84. Id. at 366.
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bearing the same trademark. 5 The Second Circuit determined that the correct
inquiry asks "whether the [licensor] sufficiently policed and inspected its
licensees' operations to guarantee the quality of the products they sold under
its trademarks to the public."86 Although no one disputes the necessity of
quality control, no bright-line rule exists explaining what constitutes an "ade-
quate" level of quality control.87
Courts determine the adequacy of control on a case-by-case basis.8 One
commentator divided the types of quality control into six categories: (1) actual
control by the licensor;89 (2) a mere contractual right to control; (3) control
by an agent of the licensor; (4) control by a third party;' (5) reasonable reli-
ance on the licensee to control itself; and (6) control by stock ownership.9
B. Stanfield v. Osborne Industries:9
The Tenth Circuit's Adoption of the "Naked" License Rule
Stanfield, a developer of agricultural products, agreed to allow Osborne
Industries, Inc. (OII) to manufacture certain agricultural products for royal-
ties.93 Additionally, Stanfield began working for Oll.94 Pursuant to a subse-
quent agreement, Stanfield allowed OlI to use "Stanfield" as a trademark for
fifteen years in exchange for $75.00.95 Eventually the relationship between
Stanfield and OII soured.96 Stanfield quit his job at OII, and the contract
85. Id. at 367. The court reasoned that because the primary goal of the Lanham Act is to
protect against confusion, and the public cannot adequately protect itself against deceptive use of a
trademark, a licensor must take steps to ensure that others do not misuse the trademark. Id.
86. Id. The Second Circuit found no error in the district court's finding that Dawn had exer-
cised adequate control and supervision. Id. at 367-68.
87. The licensor does not need to be involved in the day-to-day operations of the licensee to
ensure quality control. Oberlin, 596 F.2d at 1327.
88. Parks, supra note 80, at 540.
89. William M. Borchard & Richard M. Osman, Trademark Sublicensing and Quality Con-
trol, 70 TRADEMARK REP. 99, 100-04 (1980).
90. Id. at 105. Granting a license to use the trademark on pharmaceutical products falls
within this category. Id. Since the FDA regulates the quality of pharmaceuticals, the licensor may
rely on the FDA's regulation of quality control. Id.
91. Id. at 106-07.
92. 52 F.3d 867 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 314 (1995). It is not surprising that the
Tenth Circuit recognized the requirement of quality control. Presumably everyone accepts the
quality control requirement without controversy. Parks, supra note 80, at 534-35.
93. Stanfield, 52 F.3d at 869.
94. Id.
95. Id. The pertinent language of the license follows:
WHEREAS, Second Party [011] desires to use the name "Stanfield" on all or part of the
products manufactured by Second Party whether or not the same be invented by First
Party, as a distinctive mark on said products in conjunction with the name of said prod-
ucts, and
WHEREAS, Second Party [OII] desires to use the name "Stanfield" as a distinctive
mark on all or part of its products manufactured, at its discretion for a period of Fifteen
(15) years from the date of this agreement and that said design of the distinctive mark
bearing the name "Stanfield" shall be at the sole discretion of said party of the Second
Part [011] as to the design of the same ....
96. Id. at 870.
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between OII and Stanfield expired. 97 011 registered "Stanfield" as its trade-
mark.9 In September 1991 Stanfield requested that 011 discontinue using
"Stanfield" as a trademark. 99 OI continued using the "Stanfield" name and
Stanfield initiated suit against OII. Stanfield alleged that OII's use of the
"Stanfield" name violated 15 U.S.C. § 1125, which prohibits false representa-
tions about the quality of goods and false designation of product origin.
Stanfield also alleged that 011 fraudulently procured the mark, and that 011
was liable under various state laws.'' The district court entered summary
judgment in favor of 0II.02
The Tenth Circuit held that the July 1975 agreement granted 011 a naked
license. 3 Pursuant to the agreement, Stanfield had allowed OII "to use the
mark on any quality or type of good [011] chooses."'" The court concluded
that under the agreement, Stanfield failed to exercise control over the quality
of goods produced by 011 bearing the "Stanfield" name. Hence, Stanfield
abandoned any rights to the trademark by granting 011 a naked license to the
trademark. 05
The Tenth Circuit also addressed Stanfield's claim that even if he had not
expressly controlled quality through the agreement, he had reasonably relied
on 011 to maintain quality."° The court rejected this argument, stating that
Stanfield and 011 did not have the "special relationship" required for reliance
to substitute for quality control. 7 The continued litigation between Stanfield
and 011 and the acrimonious nature of the parties' relationship persuaded the
court that such a relationship did not exist."
C. Other Circuits
Every circuit addressing this issue has recognized the naked license theo-
ry, under which the holder of a trademark can lose trademark rights through
non-use or abandonment." 9 However, some cases indicate that a licensor
does not automatically abandon a trademark by failing to personally maintain
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 869-70.
100. Id. at 870.
101. Id. Because the district court did not exercise jurisdiction over the state law claims, the
Tenth Circuit did not address them. Id.
102. ld. at 868.
103. Id. at 871.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 871-72. It is irrelevant that the license was for a fixed term of years, since the right
that Stanfield must retain is the right to control the quality of the products that bear the name
"Stanfield." Id.
106. Id. at 872.
107. Id. The court cited, as examples of cases in which a "special relationship" existed, Taco
Cabana Int'l, Inc. v. Two Pesos, Inc., 932 F.2d 13 (5th Cir. 1991) and Land O'Lakes Cream-
eries, Inc. v. Oconomowoc Canning Co., 330 F.2d 667 (7th Cir. 1964). Id.
108. Stanfield, 52 F.3d at 873.
109. E.g., Taco Cabana, 932 F.2d at 1121; Tally-Ho, Inc. v. Coast Community College Dist.,
889 F.2d 1018, 1022-23 (11th Cir. 1989); Kulack v. The Pearl Jack, 178 F.2d 154, 156 (6th Cir.
1949).
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quality control. These cases involve a licensor who reasonably relies on the
licensee's control of quality.
In Taco Cabana International, Inc. v. Two Pesos, Inc.," the Fifth Cir-
cuit held that a lack of certified quality'control did not result in abandon-
ment. "' Two brothers operated several Taco Cabana Mexican restau-
rants." '2 The brothers later split the business, one retaining the Taco Cabana
name and the other using the name "TaCasita.""' 3 Despite the split, the
brothers agreed to share the Taco Cabana trade dress."4 The Fifth Circuit
held that the brothers did not abandon the Taco Cabana trade dress because
the brothers had engaged in a close working relationship and could rely on
each other's working relationship to maintain quality control." 5
Similarly, in Land O'Lakes Creameries v. Oconomowoc Canning,"6 the
Seventh Circuit recognized a set of circumstances in which a licensee could
rely on the licensor to exercise quality control. In Land O'Lakes, the defendant
agreed to allow a licensee to use the trade name "Land O'Lakes" on canned
goods." ' The licensee used the name for forty years.' The court held that
the agreement was "more than a naked license" and did not constitute an
abandonment of the mark because there had been no complaints about the
quality of goods over this forty year time period."' The court affirmed the
lower court's decision that the "defendant's reliance on the Licensee's control
over the quality of products constituted sufficient supervision to protect the
quality of the goods bearing the trade-mark.'
20
D. Analysis
In Stanfield, the Tenth Circuit adopted the majority rule that granting a
license to use a trade name without maintaining quality control results in a
trademark's abandonment. Stanfield clearly granted a license without maintain-
ing quality control, as the license agreement did not provide for quality control
and Stanfield did not exercise actual quality control.
The Tenth Circuit gave little credit to the fact that Stanfield had once
worked for OII and was reasonably aware of the quality of Oil's goods. Like-
wise, the fact that no litigation ensued over the quality of goods bearing the
"Stanfield" trademark did not persuade the court. The Tenth Circuit empha-
sized that the parties must have a "special relationship" before a licensor may
110. 932 F.2d 113 (5th Cir. 1991), affd on other grounds, 505 U.S. 763 (1992).
111. Taco Cabana, 932 F.2d at 1121-22.
112. Id. at 1117.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 1121-22.
116. 330 F.2d 667 (7th Cir. 1964).
117. Land O'Lakes, 330 F.2d at 669.
118. Id. at 670.
119. Id. The district court also based its decision on the following factors: (1) that the licensee
exercised adequate quality control; (2) that the licensor was familiar with the quality of products
produced by the licensee; and (3) that the licensee's distributor received all quality related com-
plaints. Borchard & Osman, supra note 89, at 106.
120. Land O'Lakes, 330 F.2d at 670.
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rely on the licensee to maintain quality control. But the court failed to describe
the circumstances under which such a relationship might exist. Thus, the cir-
cumstances in which reliance on a licensee can substitute for a licensor's
obligation to maintain quality control remains an open question.
CONCLUSION
The importance of Vornado and Stanfield goes beyond the fact that both
are cases of first impression in the Tenth Circuit. Attorneys practicing in the
intellectual property area should be aware that the Lanham Act may not pro-
tect an invention with a completely nonfunctional and unique appearance, even
if the invention is "a described, significant inventive aspect of [an] inven-
tion."'21 Stanfield gave the Tenth Circuit the opportunity to address the im-
portance of maintaining quality control when licensing a trade name, and
providing an example of when a licensor cannot rely on a licensee to maintain
quality control. Perhaps the best lesson to be learned from Stanfield is that
prospective licensors should seek representation prior to entering into an
agreement.
Timothy W. Gordon
121. Vornado, 58 F.3d at 1510.
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